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ESSAY

Informational Cronyism
Donald C. Langevoort*
I.

The Issues in Salman

If Maher Kara, the Citigroup analyst at the center of the Salman case now
before the Supreme Court, 1 was forbidden under SEC Rule 10b-5 from trading
securities for his own account while in possession of the valuable secrets to
which his job gave him access, should he instead be able to give that information
to family members simply in order to enrich them? I suspect that to anyone
unfamiliar with the fine line drawing of federal insider trading law, the answer
is clearly no. There is probably no more common form of corruption than
generously shoveling the fruits of power and privilege to family and close
friends. 2 Cultures lacking a strong rule of law make it an art form.
Fortunately, that intuition conforms to the text of the Supreme Court
precedent most directly on point, Dirks v. SEC. 3 Justice Powell’s 1983 opinion for
the Court makes benefit to the tipper a crucial element of joint tipper-tippee
liability, but then explicitly, if somewhat awkwardly, says the necessary benefit
exists when the tip is a “gift . . . to a trading relative or friend.” 4 Justice Powell—
a former corporate lawyer no doubt familiar with the corrosiveness of family
and crony favoritism—presumably included that language knowing full well
that such behavior was a quintessential form of fiduciary breach of the duty of
* Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
Thanks to Donna Nagy and Adam Pritchard for helpful comments.
1. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 899 (2016).
2. On the “tunneling” of assets to friends, family, and self, see, e.g., Simon Johnson et al.,
Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 22, 22-23 (2000); Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, Agency
Problems in Large Family Business Groups, 27 ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRAC. 367, 369
(2003). On insider trading as corruption, see generally Sung Hui Kim, Insider Trading as
Private Corruption, 61 UCLA L. REV. 928 (2014) (developing a theory of insider trading
liability as a form of corruption).
3. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
4. Id. at 662, 664. The Dirks test has two parts, the first of which is breach of fiduciary duty
for personal benefit by the tipper. Id. at 660, 663-64. The second requires that the tippee
knows or should know of that breach. Id. at 660. The Court gives three examples of types
of benefit that satisfy the test, of which gift-giving is the third. Id. at 664.
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loyalty. 5 Salman, then, should be an easy case for the Court. The Ninth Circuit
got it absolutely right.
Salman is only noteworthy because the Ninth Circuit’s approach to personal
benefit conflicts with the Second Circuit’s 2014 decision in United States v.
Newman, 6 which offered a revisionist reading of Dirks, thus setting up the
inconsistency in the law that the Court is now being asked to resolve. Newman
redefines the “family and friends” benefit, limiting it to situations where there is
an “exchange that is objective, consequential and represents at least a potential
gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.” 7 To be sure, the facts of Salman
might satisfy even that standard given how the Kara family seems to look out
for each other, but the Ninth Circuit took pains to reject entirely the Second
Circuit’s heavy-handed editing and Salman’s reliance on it. 8
The Government’s strategy in arguing Salman thus seems straightforward:
urge the Court to read and apply Dirks literally, without any gloss. It is difficult
to believe that a majority of the Court really wants to announce to the world
that in the struggle between fiduciary duty and family-style greed, greed wins.
Insider trading enforcement is about political symbolism, a branding of
American-style regulation through narratives that punish an excess of greed or
abuse of privilege, 9 albeit within a doctrinal framework necessarily tied to
deception in order to justify fraud liability under Rule 10b-5. The facts of Salman
reek of arrogance and infidelity.
What makes the right advocacy strategy a bit harder is that both
prosecutors and the SEC have chafed under Dirks since its inception and find it
5. Justice Powell would probably agree. While this Essay leaves most of the story of how

6.

7.
8.
9.

Dirks came to be to Adam Pritchard’s legal archaeology, Justice Powell apparently started
from the belief that the insider-fiduciary’s faithless motivation (including gift-giving) is
sufficient to establish liability. A.C. Pritchard, Dirks and the Genesis of Personal Benefit, 68
SMU L. REV. 857, 862 (2015). The objective “personal benefit” add-on was Justice
O’Connor’s idea. Id. at 865-66. Justice Powell’s elaboration of the three kinds of benefits
softens this accommodation, presumably to make clear that benefit to the tipper is just
evidence of corrupt intent, a category that includes family cronyism. So even Justice
Powell—the founding father of tipper-tippee liability—would likely favor liability in
Salman.
773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 242 (2015). Newman seems correct on one
basic point: the tippee must be sufficiently aware of a benefit, not just that there was
some kind of breach of confidentiality. Id. at 447-50.
Id. at 452.
United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 899
(2016).
See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of
Insider Trading Regulation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1320-21 (1999). For a more recent
account of both the law and the politics of insider trading enforcement, see DONALD C.
LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, SELLING RISK: CORPORATIONS, WALL STREET, AND THE
DILEMMAS OF INVESTOR PROTECTION 64-66 (2016).
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unnecessarily restrictive. Thus, while winning the case is of first-order
importance, nudging the Court to endorse a flexible standard for tipper-tippee
liability is also a goal. This is not just a self-serving tactic for making tipping
cases easier for the government to win. The Dirks test has long been criticized as
substantively incoherent from a wide variety of perspectives; 10 even Richard
Epstein’s recent neoconservative restatement of insider trading law in light of
Newman has little good to say about it conceptually. 11 As we shall see, this test
has not held up well over time.
There is much at stake here. The Second Circuit’s narrowing of personal
benefit was not in the intra-familial context, but instead in the murky world of
selective disclosure from company insiders to analysts and portfolio managers. 12
Sometimes there are quid pro quos, sometimes not. Newman gave a green light to
tips that lack “a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.” 13 That is frustrating to
government enforcers, who see all sorts of mischief in such cronyism. Many
(perhaps most) insider tips are at the very least arrogant displays of status and
power: high-level insiders display their dominance, lesser ones their access. The
motivation behind such displays is some diffuse combination of ego basking and
the expectation that favors are often repaid. Before Newman, it could reasonably
be assumed that these motivations fit snugly between Dirks’ second and third
types of benefits: reputational and gift-giving. 14 Newman implies otherwise,
however. The Second Circuit’s language is pernicious in a wide variety of
professional settings that involve fiduciary disloyalty without any visible return
promise. Under any sensible reading of Dirks, there should be liability when an
insider plays a corrupted Santa Claus with corporate secrets, even if the
relationship is not of the “best friend forever” variety.
So that frames the tactical question for the Government: how to win its case
against Salman and prompt language in the opinion that repudiates Newman on
selective disclosure and gift-giving or—even better—softens Dirks’ insistence on
personal benefit. In the hands of a thoughtful Justice, the crafting of such an
opinion without doing violence to the core of the earlier precedent would not
be hard. Personal benefit makes some sense because it ties tipping to trading as
twin forms of fiduciary disloyalty. As noted, the cronyism of gift-based tipping
puts it easily in the disloyalty category.

10. See 18 DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT AND

PREVENTION § 4:5 (West 2016).

11. Richard A. Epstein, Returning to Common-Law Principles of Insider Trading After United

States v. Newman, 125 YALE L.J. 1482, 1508-10 (2016). Epstein sees Salman as a relatively
easy case on its facts. Id. at 1528.
12. Newman, 773 F.3d at 443-44.
13. Id. at 452.
14. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663-64.
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Justice Powell was deeply concerned with the idea of imposing liability
where the tippee was unaware that the information derived from fiduciary
misuse. 15 (He also held an overly rosy view of the role of investment analysts in
the financial markets, writing more than a decade before recognition of the
pervasiveness of analyst conflicts of interest became commonplace. 16) But the
work of providing protection to tippees who act in good faith should be left
mainly to the awareness requirement, the second step in the Dirks test. The
sensible approach is to acknowledge that fiduciary irresponsibility comes in
forms both subtle and blatant, inside families and in business settings. Any
disloyalty should suffice, so long as the tippee is in a position to understand that
the disloyalty motivated the tip. The next two sections will elaborate on this and
offer some other ideas that could be worked into an opinion making Salman a
new and better Dirks.
II. The Road to Salman
As the foregoing comments on Salman, Newman, and Dirks show, insider
trading law is still a work in progress. Some underappreciated turning points as
the law has wobbled between an excess of ambition and undue restriction are
worth noting.
Contemporary insider trading jurisprudence starts not with Dirks but with
Chiarella v. United States, 17 three years earlier. There, the Court—in a seminal
opinion by Justice Powell—established that insider trading liability under Rule
10b-5 derives from the insider’s breach of fiduciary duty to other marketplace
traders. 18 The standard doctrinal story is that the decisions in the Chiarella and
Dirks cases were repudiations of the SEC’s theretofore boundless “parity of
information” approach to insider trading liability, supposedly promising all
investors a level playing field in terms of information access. 19 But parity of
information oversimplified the official position at the time, which was severely
tested by the recognition that much insider trading was based on market
information, the supposed lifeblood of Wall Street. 20 The SEC wanted some
combination of access and awareness of impropriety to determine who could
trade or not. The clearest formulation of this came in a 1971 administrative
15. Id. at 662-63.
16. Id. at 658. For a discussion of analyst conflicts and insider trading, see LANGEVOORT,

INSIDER TRADING, supra note 10, § 11:2-3.

17. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
18. Id. at 230.
19. Chiarella was quite clear in rejecting the parity approach. 445 U.S. at 233.
20. See generally Arthur Fleischer, Jr. et al., An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to Disclose

Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798 (1973) (setting forth challenges to insider
trading doctrine when secrets involve knowledge of future marketplace activity, such
as a tender offer).
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proceeding, In re Investors Management Co. 21 This awareness/fairness-based
approach made it easy to hold tippees liable, without much further inquiry.
Because of the subsequent reformulation of the law by the Supreme Court,
that SEC opinion can be put in the historical dustbin. Not so the concurrence by
Commissioner Richard Smith, who was an establishment conservative much
like Justice Powell in background and demeanor. As Justice Powell would a
decade later, Commissioner Smith insisted that duty was the key to insider
trading liability. 22 Accordingly, he crafted an approach to tipper-tippee liability
based on the tipper’s breach of duty, with tippee liability deriving from the
tipper’s breach. 23 Justice Powell even explicitly gave Smith credit for this in
Dirks. 24 But there is a key difference between the two opinions. While Smith
clearly saw the insider’s fiduciary duty as significant, he did not believe it was
the only possible source of duty. For example, Smith said that the non-fiduciary
theft of information would also violate a duty to the issuer (and thus trigger
tippee liability); otherwise too troubling a loophole would be left open in insider
trading law. 25
Had Justice Powell similarly been willing to treat duty as flexible enough to
extend beyond the fiduciary principle when the misuse of information was
patently wrongful, tipper-tippee law would have taken a different and better
course. Instead, now tightly locked into the fiduciary framework, the Court had
to find a way to “fiduciarize” tippees who otherwise have no relationship with
the company whose shares they are trading. 26 The solution was the two-part
Dirks test now at issue in Salman. In other words, the Dirks test is not an ad hoc
judicial expression of preferred insider trading policy but rather an effort to
describe when the actions of tipper and tippee are knit together closely enough
to charge the tippee with breach of the tipper’s fiduciary duty. That is worth
keeping in mind.
As noted earlier, the SEC and prosecutors despised the new constraints.
They went to work to craft an alternative insider trading liability theory, based
on misappropriation as a deceptive breach of fiduciary duty to the source of the
information. Once this misappropriation theory gained traction in the lower
21. Inv’rs Mgmt. Co., Exchange Act Release No. 9267, 44 SEC Docket 633, 644 (July 29, 1971).
22. Id. at 649-50 (Comm’r Smith, concurring).
23. Id.
24. 463 U.S. at 662-63.
25. 44 SEC Docket at 650 n.2 (“A duty not to steal or knowingly receive stolen goods or

exercise dominion over goods known to be owned by others exists toward the
corporation even without the presence of a special relationship.”).
26. 445 U.S. at 230 n.12. For this, the Court cites an ABA Committee Letter, which in turn
cites Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 822 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds sub nom.
Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974). Schein addressed insider trading liability under
Florida common law. Id. at 820; see also LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING, supra note 10,
§ 4:8.
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courts, enforcers started arguing that Dirks’ personal benefit test did not apply
at all in misappropriation cases. 27 Rather, noticing how closely the
misappropriation theory resembled the analytical structure for honest services
fraud under the federal mail and wire fraud statutes, 28 they argued that tippees
were essentially trafficking in stolen information, so tippee liability was
justifiable as long as the tippee was sufficiently aware of the taint, without
regard for any insider benefit. A key win for the enforcers was United States v.
Falcone, written by then-Judge Sotomayor, a high-profile misappropriation case
where the personal benefit issue was essentially ignored. 29 Eventually, this
distinction was abandoned—the Second Circuit later ruled that Dirks does apply
to misappropriation 30—but the stolen goods idea persists in theory and dicta. 31
As an earlier case that then-Judge Sotomayor relied on in Falcone had pointed
out, everyone understands that the passage of valuable secrets is “not for
nothing.” 32 The Supreme Court should keep that in mind in Salman too.
Over time, the Dirks test itself was applied more and more liberally by the
lower courts. 33 The pecuniary-benefit prong of the personal benefit test, for
example, has been found satisfied not only by money but also by in-kind
conveyances, including a jar of honey, live lobsters, restaurant dinners, and
tickets to the musical Jersey Boys. 34 Nearly all courts applying the gift prong for
personal benefit now at issue in Salman have done so liberally, with a few hinting
that the simple absence of a legitimate business reason for conveying the
information was enough to make it a gift tip. 35 Eventually, there was not much
left to the personal benefit test except for showing some kind of breach by the
27. See LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING, supra note 10, § 6:13 (collecting cases).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 1341, 1343 (2015).
29. 257 F.3d 226, 234-35 (2d Cir. 2001). Falcone involved the improper advance distribution

30.
31.
32.
33.

34.
35.

of copies of Business Week magazine, from which recipients could see what companies
would be mentioned favorably or unfavorably, and trade in advance of the marketmoving commentary. Id. at 227.
See SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 285-88 (2d Cir. 2012).
See SEC v. Payton, 97 F. Supp. 3d 558, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 600 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Sablone v.
United States, 510 U.S. 976 (1993).
The SEC and prosecutors were emboldened to push back against the strictures of the
Dirks test by Congress, which passed two insider trading sanction enhancements in 1984
and 1988 on an overwhelming bipartisan basis. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677; Insider Trading Sanctions
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264. In the course of the former, a House
committee expressed its hope that Dirks would be read narrowly so as not to exculpate
bona fide insider trading abuses. H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 14-15 (1983).
LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING, supra note 10, § 4:6 at 4-12.
See, e.g., SEC v. Rubin, No. 91 CIV. 6531(MBM), 1993 WL 405428, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8,
1993).
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tipper of his duty of loyalty and the tippee’s awareness thereof. And as all of this
was happening, the SEC’s adoption of Regulation FD in 2000 took direct aim at
the kind of selective disclosure to analysts that Justice Powell (naively, I think)
had treated as an unqualified good. 36 In sum, Dirks has not held up all that well
over time.
This chapter of the story culminated in Newman. The softening of Dirks
happened just as there appeared to be a rapid rise in criminal prosecutions in the
Southern District of New York and a lengthening of sentences for
noncooperators. Even those otherwise disposed to strong insider trading
enforcement raised questions about staying within the law’s spirit and bounds. 37
So the pushback was no surprise, only its form and intensity. Now the Supreme
Court will have its say. Is a stronger Dirks needed, or are there other, better ways
to address the overcriminalization threat?
III. Other Directions
As noted at the end of Part I, the most satisfying way to interpret Dirks today
is to say that any deceptive form of corruption or disloyalty by the tipper suffices
under the first part of the test, leaving the work of protecting tippees who act in
good faith to the second part: the awareness prong. However, the grant of
certiorari in Salman was only on the first part of the Dirks test: the meaning of
personal benefit in the family gift-giving setting.
Newman addressed both parts of the test. Under the facts of the case, its
holding that the tippees had insufficient awareness of any breach by the tipper
is palatable. But the reasoning is pernicious, insisting that prosecutors must
prove that the tippee knew of the breach. That is not what Dirks says. Although
Newman quotes Dirks accurately at the outset that the standard is that the tippee
“knows or should know” of the breach and benefit, 38 everything in the court’s
analysis thereafter ignores the word “should.” Perhaps Newman was thinking just
about criminal prosecutions, where the added statutory burden of showing
willfulness might justify the more stringent standard of proof. That would be a

36. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2015). Regulation FD makes it unlawful for a high-level insider of a

public company to convey material nonpublic information to an analyst, portfolio
manager, or large shareholder unless that same information is publicly disclosed at the
same time. Id.
37. E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Mapping the Future of Insider Trading Law: Of Boundaries, Gaps,
and Strategies, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 281, 283-84.
38. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 446 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 242 (2015)
(emphasis added) (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983)). Interestingly, to “know
or have reason to know” are the words Commissioner Smith used in Investors
Management. Inv’rs Mgmt. Co., Exchange Act Release No. 9267, 44 SEC Docket 633, 649
(July 29, 1971) (Comm’r Smith, concurring).
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more fitting reaction to prosecutorial zeal, but the opinion does not indicate that
was its reason. 39
It would be helpful, then, if somewhere in the Salman opinion the Court
would offer more clarity on the tippee’s required state of mind, if only to show
that heavy-handedness on the personal benefit prong is unnecessary when there
is a fair insistence on awareness of the breach. The Court could do even more
good by framing how the inquiry into the tippee’s awareness works in criminal
cases as opposed to civil ones. To this day, the precise meaning of “willfulness”
in securities fraud is inexcusably elusive, 40 yet it represents the most direct
connection to the overcriminalization problem that so many see and that
animated the Court’s recent activism in pruning white-collar crime
prosecutions. 41
Beyond those helpful clarifications, is it plausible that the Court might take
this occasion to be far more aggressive and rethink its insider trading
jurisprudence entirely? There is much to be said, as Donna Nagy urges, 42 for
jettisoning both Chiarella and Dirks as failed experiments and substituting a
more flexible duty to abstain or disclose that includes information wrongfully
obtained by theft and conversion—Chief Justice Burger’s dissenting approach in
Chiarella, 43 and Commissioner Smith’s in Investors Management. 44 This Essay
leaves it to Nagy to explain why this is the best way to make sense of insider
trading law, especially as it is articulated in the third case of the Supreme Court’s
insider trading trilogy, United States v. O’Hagan. 45 This Court, however, may be
too incrementalist for so bold an approach and is more likely to say that any
flaws in the doctrinal foundation are for Congress to fix.
39. A simpler solution would have been simply to correct the trial judge, who had said that

40.

41.

42.
43.
44.
45.

tippee knowledge need not extend to the benefit, only the breach. See Newman, 773 F.3d
at 447-48 (discussing trial court ruling).
Section 32 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (2015), makes criminal liability
depend on a showing of willfulness, above and beyond the violation itself. Precisely what
that means has long been unclear. See generally Samuel W. Buell, What Is Securities Fraud?,
61 DUKE L.J. 511, 555-60 (2011) (discussing the meaning of fraud for criminal
prosecutions).
Other recent cases demonstrate a concern with white-collar crime overbreadth. See
McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (overturning governor’s bribery
conviction for overbroad interpretation of “official act”); Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct.
1074 (2015) (refusing to treat disposal of fish as criminal destruction of records); and
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010) (narrowing honest services fraud standard for
corporate misbehavior).
Donna M. Nagy, Beyond Dirks: Gratuitous Tipping and Insider Trading, 42 J. CORP. L.
(forthcoming 2016).
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 240 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
See supra text accompanying notes 21-25.
521 U.S. 642 (1997) (upholding misappropriation theory for insider trading liability).
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The possibility of a legislative solution surely will be in the Court’s mind
whatever it does. Since Chiarella, the Court has been frustrated at Congress and
the SEC for leaving nearly all the fashioning of securities fraud law, particularly
insider trading law, to the courts. 46 The Court will likely express this frustration
yet again in Salman. Only Congress has the authority to do what really needs to
be done: create an insider trading prohibition, not as an awkward derivative of
the law of deceit, but rather as a distinct form of market abuse. Since Newman,
efforts in that direction have begun. If the Court wanted to be entirely strategic,
it could simply render a horrible decision to pressure Congress to act (what
contract scholars call a penalty default interpretation). 47
Of course, putting the law of insider trading up for political bidding is not
necessarily the route to a better place. If insider trading is worth prohibiting,
however, the prohibition should cover all tippees who are aware that the
information has come to them in a visibly wrongful way, whether by breach of
fiduciary duty, sale of the information, gratuitous conveyance, or theft. A
pending bill in the House of Representatives by Congressman Jim Himes
proposes a good step in this direction. 48 Above all, there should be a meaningful
separation between criminal insider trading and that which can be remedied
only through civil enforcement.
Legislation is for the future, however—if ever. For now, it is difficult to
imagine anyone genuinely opposed to deeming what Maher Kara or Bassam
Salman did unlawful insider trading. 49 Read judiciously, Dirks concurs.
Hopefully the Court will not make a bigger mess of things by suggesting
otherwise.

46. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233-34.
47. See, e.g., Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Penalty Default Canon, 72 GEO. WASH. L.

REV. 663, 664 (2004).

48. H.R. 1625, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015) (creating liability for any person who trades on material

nonpublic information if such person “knows, or recklessly disregards, that such
information has been obtained wrongfully, or . . . [that using it to trade securities] would
constitute a wrongful use of such information”).
49. Unless they think insider trading should not be unlawful in the first place.
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